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  1The Framing of Risks and the Communication of Sub-
jective Probabilities for Victimizations  
 
 
Abstract 
What does 'likely' mean, when respondents estimate the risk to become a victim of 
crime? Victimization risks can either be interpreted as gains (“being spared of offences”) 
or as losses (“becoming a victim of crime”). Because losses are perceived as more se-
vere, respondents will state lower subjective victimization probabilities in the loss-frame, 
compared to the gain-frame. We demonstrate such a framing-effect with data from an 
experimental survey. Furthermore, we show that the meaning of vague quantifiers varies 
with the frequency and the severity of the event. Respondents assign to the same vague 
quantifiers (e.g. 'unlikely') higher likelihoods in terms of percentages for frequent and for 
less severe events than for infrequent and for severe events. Because respondents do 
not use vague quantifiers consistently, it is problematic to compare subjective risks for 
different victimizations. 
 
Keywords: Response effects, framing, vague quantifiers, survey methodology, conver-
sational norms  
  21 Introduction 
„I thought you’d never come here again,“ I said. 
“Every time I see you, you say the same thing,” she said, laughing. As always, she sat down next to me at 
the bar and rested both hands on the counter. “But I did write you a note saying I wouldn’t be back for a 
while, didn’t I?” 
“For a while is a phrase whose length can’t be measured. At least by the person who’s waiting,” I 
said. 
“But there must be times when the word’s necessary. Situations when that’s the only possible word you 
can use,” she said. 
“And probably is a word whose weight is incalculable.” 
 
“South of the border, west of the sun”, Haruki Murakami (2000) 
 
 
The popular Japanese writer Haruki Murakami is pointing to a problem, which is not only 
raised in literature, but in science as well. When you walk through a scientific library, you 
come across entire book shelves dealing with the issue. Nevertheless, scientists are not 
satisfied with statements that the values of phrases like “for a while” or “probably” are 
simply immeasurable. Several attempts have been made to quantify such vague quanti-
fiers. Simpson’s (1944) essay was one of the first, which dealt with expressions of fre-
quency and their related meaning. In the meanwhile, it has been uncovered that the re-
lation between verbal expressions and quantitative measures bears high uncertainty. 
We can distinguish between intraindividual and interindividual differences (Budescu & 
Wallsten, 1995, p. 289 f.). Hakel (1969, p. 533) states the problem of interindividual dif-
ferences quite clearly with his often quoted remark, „one man’s ‚rarely’ is another man’s 
‚hardly ever’“. Bradburn & Miles (1979, p. 94) described with a compelling example intra-
individual differences: “The mean response for ‚sometimes’ in the shooting in Hollywood 
westerns context is higher than the mean response for ‚very often’ in the context of 
earthquakes.” For survey methodology, the meaning of vague quantifiers is of particular 
  3interest, as we infer from frequency statements in questionnaires the validity of theo-
ries.
1  
 
The goal of our study is to improve our understanding of respondents’ interpretation of 
probability expressions. Such interpretations have two aspects; first the perception and 
secondly the communication of probabilities. We conducted two analyses with a focus 
on subjective probabilities to become a victim of crime. In our first analysis, we demon-
strate the liability of subjective perceptions of victimization probabilities. We show that 
subjective victimization probabilities are prone to framing-effects. Our second analysis 
focuses on the communication of victimization probabilities. Here, we show that the 
framing of victimization scenarios has an impact on the meaning of vague quantifiers. In 
particular, we show that the frame of reference determines the mapping of probabilities. 
This effect can mainly be explained by the different frequency of the particular event: ‘To 
become a victim’ is rarer than ‘not to become a victim’. We argue with Bradburn & Miles 
(1979, p. 94) that for rare incidents, often refers to lower frequencies than for common 
incidents.  
 
We analyze two aspects of survey responses: First, we analyze wording effects for dif-
ferent frames of victimization scenarios in terms of gains versus losses. Second, we 
analyze the meaning of probability statements via mapping the vague quantifiers to nu-
meric expressions. Our findings can be applied to various fields of interest, for instance 
to medicine. It is known (Edwards, Elwyn, Covey, Matthews, & Pill, 2001; Welken-
                                                 
1 One example for the usage of vague quantifiers can be found in the British Crime Survey: “First, how 
likely do you think your home is to be burgled in the next year? (…) And how likely do you think you are 
mugged or robbed in the next year?“ Possible answer categories are: Very likely, fairly likely, fairly unlikely 
and very unlikely (British Crime Survey, 2004/2005).  
  4huysen, Evers-Kiebooms, & D’Ydewalle, 2001; Peters, McCaul, Stefanek, & Nelson, 
2006) that the chosen frame of communicating health risks (e.g. the probability of suffer-
ing from side effects or the probability of cancer) influences patients’ decisions for or 
against preventive medical checkups.
2  
 
2 Literature Review 
2.1 Communication of probabilities 
Like in every-day language, vague quantifiers are also used in scientific studies. For in-
stance, people are asked to specify the frequency of certain behaviour with often, fre-
quently, seldom and never, as “how often have you been happy in the past week?” 
However, the usage of vague quantifiers often implies biased comparability of item re-
sponses (Schnell & Kreuter, 2000; Kreuter, 2002, p. 226-229). Nevertheless, they are 
still applied despite the availability of alternatives such as measurement via numerical 
frequency scales. So why is it that we still use vague quantifiers instead of asking for the 
precise value?  
 
First of all it can be said that vague quantifiers are the natural answer to many questions 
(Wallsten, Budescu, Zwick, & Kemp, 1993). The question about the rate of happiness in 
the past week is difficult to answer with precise frequency measures. Thus, interviewees 
prefer to answer such questions verbally and not numerically (Moxey & Sanford, 2000). 
In contrast, it is preferred to receive information numerically (Budescu & Wallsten, 1995, 
p. 298). If interviewees are nevertheless asked to quantify their answers, most answer 
the question after some time of reflection. Only very few refuse an answer (Bradburn & 
                                                 
2 Depending on whether losses in terms of side effects or gains in terms of being spared of cancer are 
stressed, patients make decisions in favour of or against medical check-ups. 
  5Miles, 1979, 95). However, precise quantitative evaluations are difficult and require high 
cognitive efforts (Peters, McCaul, Stefanek, & Nelson, 2006, p. 46). Thus, much time 
and concentration is needed for the interview. In addition, it occurs that in fact there is 
no precise answer but the respondent makes up the quantitative information randomly 
(Conrad, Brown, & Cashman, 1998, p. 363). Furthermore, answers to retrospective 
questions are influenced by the respondents’ strategy to derive an exact answer (Con-
rad, Brown, & Cashman, 1998). Depending on the nature and the frequency of the inci-
dent, the respondent counts his experiences, makes an extrapolation or generates a 
number from the data known to him from other sources. It is however not apparent to 
the interviewer, which strategy was chosen for which question. As a consequence, the 
precision of the information remains uncertain. 
 
As numeric answers often suggest an artificial degree of precision, which is not reflected 
by respondents’ characteristics, it seems more adequate to use vague quantifiers – if we 
only knew what they meant. If it were known, which vague quantifier is related to which 
numeric value, it was possible to use the more comprehensible method of vague quanti-
fiers in surveys and to translate their meaning afterwards into quantitative information. 
The mapping method serves this purpose in allocating numeric values to vague quantifi-
ers (Wright, Gaskell, & O’Muircheartaigh, 1994, p. 481). 
 
The theoretical foundation of the mapping method can be found in the concept of mem-
bership functions (Hammerton, 1976). In particular, it is assumed that verbal probability 
expressions are imprecise concepts, which can be represented by numeric probabilities 
between 0 and 1. The membership function for a specific verbal expression assigns a 
  6number to each value between 0 and 1. This number defines the degree of consistency 
between the verbal expression and the numeric probability: „Probability phrases are 
vague concepts and (…) different numerical probabilities in the [0, 1] range are repre-
sented to various degrees in these concepts. (…) The membership function of any given 
phrase assigns a number to each value on the probability line [0, 1] that represents its 
degree of membership in the concept defined by the phrase.” (Karelitz & Budescu, 2004, 
p. 27).  
 
Early studies assumed for each verbal expression only one membership function 
(Hammerton, 1976). But soon, it was realized that membership functions and mapping 
techniques can be largely influenced by various factors. Psychological studies often em-
phasize the importance of the context. Goocher (1965) argues that mapping depends on 
respondents’ affection for the object. The more respondents like an event or an object, 
the smaller the frequency expressions used. Pepper & Prytulak (1974) and Moxey & 
Sanford (1993, 2000) demonstrate the effect of base rate expectations: “In particular, if 
an event has a high base-rate expectation, such as people enjoying parties, then the 
values assigned to (say) many in many people enjoyed the party is higher than it is for a 
low baserate expectation (as in many of the doctors in the hospital were female).” 
(Moxey & Sanford, 2000, p. 241). Furthermore, Schwarz, Hippler, Deutsch & Strack 
(1985) stress the impact of scaling. If the lower part of the scale is subdivided into many 
subtle categories, respondents state lower TV consumption compared to if the upper 
part of the scale is strongly subdivided.
3 Finally, Hörmann (1983) and Newstead & Cov-
                                                 
3 Comparable effects as those for asking about the frequency of television consumption were observed 
for other behavioural patterns such as sexual behaviour or consumer behaviour (Schwarz & Scheuring, 
  7entry (2000) show that the size of the particular object in the question matters: „[A] few 
people in front of a building meant more than a few people standing in front of a hut” 
(Newstead & Coventry, 2000, p. 244). 
 
So far, we dealt with cases, for which the interpretation of vague quantifiers affect all 
respondents similarly. However, cases are even more problematic, in which the 
interpretation of vague quantifiers affect particular groups differently. It is possible that 
regression estimates of group differences for particular opinions or attitudes are not due 
to actual group differences in these opinions but to group differences in interpreting the 
scales. Schaeffer (1991) could demonstrate such an effect. He asked black and white 
respondents to specify their frequency of being bored. When using numeric values, he 
found no differences. However, when asked with vague quantifiers, black respondents 
answered to be more frequently bored than white respondents. Furthermore, Nakao & 
Axelrod (1983) show such group differences between doctors and patients in 
interpreting verbal frequency expressions like “infrequent” or “not frequently”. Finally, 
King, Murray, Salomon & Tandon (2004) demonstrate cultural differences in using 
response scales.  
 
Wänke (2002) highlighted the importance of reference groups. Students, who compare 
themselves with the entire population, estimate the frequency of going to the cinema 
higher than those comparing themselves to other students. Likewise, the field of 
reference matters. “For example, when judging how often one goes to the movies, the 
                                                                                                                                                              
1988; Menon, Raghubir & Schwarz, 1995). In addition, similar effects occurred when patients reported on 
their rate of suffering from physical symptoms (Schwarz & Scheuring, 1992).  
  8response may depend on whether one compares this behaviour to the frequency one 
attends poetry readings or watches TV.” (Wänke, 2002, p. 302) 
 
Wright, Gaskell, & O’Muircheartaigh (1994) categorize the various factors of differential 
mapping effects into two classes. On one hand, mapping depends on information from 
own experiences. When asked to assign numeric values to the undefined adjectives 
very young, young, old, very old, respondents’ own age influence their answers. This 
assumption is called the self-information-hypothesis. On the other hand, mapping is in-
fluenced by characteristics of the social group, i.e. behaviour or language. Wright, 
Gaskell, & O’Muircheartaigh (1994) illustrate this point with a vivid example. Consider 
two isolated villages, where the inhabitants are asked for their height by using vague 
quantifiers. Let us assume that the height of the people in the first village is 1.80 meters, 
and in the other village, all people are 1.90 meters tall. Naturally, every respondent who 
is requested to estimate her height compares herself to the known others in her village 
and concludes that she has an average height. Conclusively, everybody categorizes 
herself in the middle of the scale. Thus, the usage of vague quantifiers lead to the result 
that inhabitants of both villages are estimated to have the same height – which is not the 
case. The idea, that membership in social groups affects mapping is known as the 
group-norm-hypothesis. Wright, Gaskell, & O’Muircheartaigh (1994) confirm both hy-
potheses in their study on TV consumption.
4  
 
 
                                                 
4 When respondents are first asked about the frequency of television consumption of the “typical other 
person” and afterwards about their own consumption behaviour, they state higher frequencies compared 
to the reversed order of questions.      
  92.2 Perception of probabilities  
We know that the subjective perceptions of probabilities are prone to presentational ef-
fects. Tversky & Kahneman (1981) describe in their classic study on framing two alter-
native scenarios for fighting an epidemic; a safe and a risky one. In one case, the result 
is described in terms of saved lives, in the other in terms of lives lost. Although both 
scenarios have the same statistical expectation value and are formally equivalent, re-
spondents choose the risky option when confronted with the loss-frame (number of lives 
lost), and the safe option when confronted with the gain-frame (number of lives saved).  
 
Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) suggests that a different point of refer-
ence is induced if a decision problem is presented in terms of gains compared to losses. 
Thus, the reference point differs between decisions which focus on gains and decisions 
which focus on losses. The first assumption in prospect theory states that the value 
function is concave for gains and convex for losses. The second assumption is that the 
value function is steeper for losses than for gains. It can be inferred from these proper-
ties that an event with the same probability of occurrence is psychologically more rele-
vant in the loss-frame compared to the gain-frame. In other words: To suffer from a par-
ticular loss with a likelihood of 5% is more relevant than the chance of being spared from 
the same loss with a likelihood of 95%.  
 
McNeil, Pauker, Sox & Tversky (1982) could demonstrate this effect in clinical settings. 
Patients had to decide whether they prefer a safe radio therapy or rather a risky surgery. 
In one condition, the likelihoods were presented in terms of death rates and in the other 
condition in terms of survival chances. If risks were presented in terms of death rates, 
  10fewer patients chose the risky surgery, compared to when risks were presented in terms 
of survival chances. For an overview of such framing effects in medical research see 
Marteau (1989), Banks, Salovey, Greener, Rothman, Moyer, Beauvais & Epel (1995) 
and Edwards, Elwyn, Covey, Matthews & Pill (2001).  
 
Moxey & Sanford (2000) show similar effects for consumption decisions. The respon-
dents were given two logically equivalent options to choose from – for instance 95% fat 
free yoghurt and yoghurt containing 5% fat. Most favour the 95% fat free yoghurt. It is 
argued that the wording causes this effect – in one case, the focus is on the positive as-
pect (fat free), in the other case, the attention is drawn to the negative aspect. The result 
that logically equivalent expressions are evaluated differently was already confirmed by 
Reyna (1981). She investigated the effect of negations of modal adjectives (e.g. proba-
bly or possibly). It could be shown that formal negations do not automatically imply com-
plementary numerical estimations.
5  
 
3 Subjective perceptions of victimization probabilities 
3.1 Hypotheses 
We can derive the following hypotheses by applying former reasoning to subjective 
probability estimates of victimizations: Respondents prefer to face a situation with a 95 
% probability of not becoming a victim of crime compared to a situation with a 5 % prob-
ability to become a victim of crime. We argue that the optimism in the gain frame is due 
to a relatively lower subjective victimization probability, compared to the loss frame. As a 
consequence it is expected that the probability of being spared of victimization (gain 
                                                 
5 Note that for the construction of scales, the negations by means of an affix (improbable) are stronger 
than the lexical negations (not probable). 
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come a victim of crime (loss frame). For example, the feeling of security for facing a ‘90 
% likelihood of being spared’ might be psychologically equivalent to a ‘5 % likelihood to 
become victim of crime’. We summarize our reasoning in our first hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: The subjective victimization probability will be higher in the gain frame 
(being spared of a crime) compared to the loss frame (become a victim of crime).  
 
3.2 Method 
We conducted in August 2006 an experimental survey in Leipzig, Germany. We asked 
95 taxi drivers and 96 waiters (N=191) for an estimate of their probability to become a 
victim of crime. We presented short scenarios for five different sorts of crime, in particu-
lar for being involved in a car accident, bill-dodging, theft, robbery and murder. We 
chose taxi drivers and waiters because both groups do their job in public and thus both 
are exposed to a higher risk of victimization. The respondents were selected by a two-
stage sample, with taxi stands and restaurants as the first stage and respondents as the 
second stage. We drew a random sample of the list of all taxi stands from the taxi coop-
eration in Leipzig. At each of the taxi stands, we approached the second taxi in the row, 
and repeated this process for every second taxi in the row. To select the waiters, we 
took a random sample from the list of the IHK Leipzig (industry and trade organization 
Leipzig), containing all registered restaurants. We used the last birthday method to se-
lect the waiters in a restaurant. The two versions of the questionnaire were randomized.  
 
Four interviewers conducted oral face-to-face interviews with two versions of the stan-
dardized questionnaire, which differed in the frames of presenting the probabilities. We 
  12asked half of the respondents to estimate their probability to become a victim of crime 
(loss-frame), while the other half was asked to estimate the probability of being spared 
of a crime (gain frame). Furthermore, the questionnaire contained a control question for 
the victimization ‘robbery’. The control group had to respond the question twice in the 
loss frame and the experimental group had to respond the question once in the loss-
frame and once in the gain-frame (intra-individual variation of the frame). In addition, re-
spondents had first to evaluate their probabilities on a verbal scale using vague quantifi-
ers and then on numerical scales (see table 1 in the appendix I). With the combination of 
vague quantifiers and numerical answers, we can apply the mapping methodology and 
estimate response functions. Response functions relate the verbal expressions on the x-
axis with the numerical expressions on the y-axis. We asked for responses for both the 
vague quantifiers and for the numerical values twice in the questionnaire. About five 
minutes elapsed between the two blocks of questions. 
 
3.3 Results 
First, we demonstrate framing-effects on numerical scales for subjective probabilities of 
victimization. We compare the distribution of numerical victimization probabilities in the 
gain-frame with the respective distribution in the loss-frame. We analyze the offences 
theft, robbery and car accident (question 9).  
 
Figure 1 about here (see appendix II) 
 
The data confirm hypothesis 1 for the offences robbery and theft: Respondents estimate 
higher victimization probabilities in the gain-frame, compared to the loss frame. For fur-
  13ther comparisons and for significance tests, we compare arithmetic means (see table 2 
in the appendix I). For the offences robbery and theft, probability estimates in the gain 
frame differ from those in the loss-frame in the expected direction. For instance, the 
mean chance of being robbed is 35.5 % in the gain frame compared to 21.9 % in the 
loss-frame (p < 0.01). For theft, hypothesis 1 can be confirmed as well (p < 0.01). How-
ever, for the offence car accident, hypothesis 1 cannot be confirmed. The values are 
very close to each other (51.4 % in the loss frame versus 48.8 % in the gain frame). This 
might be due to the fact that car accidents are very frequent events. In summary, we can 
confirm hypothesis 1 for the offences robbery and theft. Respondents perceive higher 
victimization probabilities if asked for being spared of crimes compared to being asked 
to become a victim of crime.  
 
4 Communication of victimization probabilities  
4.1 Hypotheses  
Our first study demonstrated that the frame of reference affects the perception of vic-
timization probabilities. Now, we elaborate our findings in a second study. We show that 
the frame of reference affects the communication of victimization probabilities. Thus, we 
argue that the framing of risks affects both, the perception and the communication of 
probabilities. Differences in the communication of risks can be represented such that the 
verbal expressions “likely” or “unlikely” have different meanings in different situations. 
Therefore, we study variation in the assignment of numerical values to vague quantifi-
ers. We argue that respondents assign lower numerical values for rarer incidents than 
for more frequent incidents. Bradburn & Miles (1979, p. 94) already speculated that “in 
short ‚often’ for an improbable event is less than often for a highly probable event.“ In 
  14our case, we make use of our different versions of the questionnaires for gains and for 
losses. These two versions represent a randomization of different frequencies of events. 
The event to become a victim of a particular crime is rarer than the event to be spared of 
the same crime. Consequently, we analyze whether respondents assign different nu-
merical values to the same vague quantifiers (e.g. likely) in the gain-frame compared to 
the loss-frame. Respondents are expected to assign to the event ‘become a victim of 
robbery’ lower numerical values compared to the event ‘being spared of robbery’.
6 We 
formulate hypothesis 2 as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: In the gain-frame (e.g. being spared of robbery), a particular verbal an-
swer category (e.g. likely) corresponds with higher numerical probabilities than in the 
loss-frame (e.g. become a victim of robbery).  
 
In a consecutive step, we analyze whether the response functions decrease with the se-
verity of the offence. In other words, we argue that for more severe offences, a “likely” 
victimization refers to lower probabilities than for less severe offences.  
                                                 
6 The frequency effect can be derived from Grice’ logic of conversation (Grice, 1993). Here, it is assumed 
that the respondent answers in accordance with the principle of relevance and with reference to the cate-
gory of relation. When the respondent is asked to estimate the probability to become a victim of robbery in 
terms of absolute probabilities, the expected answer will be around “very unlikely”. As other respondents 
will give a similar answer this information would not be relevant. Following Grice’ reasoning, the respon-
dent rather assumes that her probability estimate in relation to all other respondents’ estimates will be of 
interest. Therefore, the respondent will anchor the answer scale at her assumed average probability and 
adjust her own subjective probability accordingly. For a more detailed description of the “anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic” see Peters, McCaul, Stefanek & Nelson (2006). Note that this answering process is 
independent of the frequency of the event and can be applied to numerical as well as to verbal answer 
scales. However, when using a verbal scale, the focus is on qualitative considerations (Zimmer, 1983; 
Budescu & Wallsten, 1995, p. 303). If the own probability is evaluated in relation to the expected average 
probability of the others and this average probability is anchored to the midpoint of the answer scale, a 
relevant and relational answer is possible for both, the frequent event (‘being spared of robbery’) and the 
rare event (‘become victim of robbery’). In case of the numerical scale, quantitative considerations are 
primarily of interest. Therefore, the anchor for frequent events (‘being spared of robbery’) is set higher 
than for rare events (‘become victim of robbery’). This explains the frequency effect in the mapping-
analysis. 
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tions between vague quantifiers and numerical values decreases.  
 
For example, we expect that respondents mean with “likely” lower likelihoods, when they 
refer to becoming a victim of murder compared to becoming a victim of bill-dodging.
7  
 
4.2 Frequency of victimizations and communication patterns 
We estimate six linear bivariate OLS-regressions. We map the verbal probability state-
ments on the numeric percentage scales for the victimizations robbery, theft and car 
crash (question 9). We estimate the regressions separately for the gain- and for the 
loss-frame. We plot the resulting response functions graphically for each victimization 
(Wright, Gaskell & O’Muircheartaigh, 1994, p. 481).
8 The x-axis represents the verbal 
answer scales and the y-axis the values of the percentage scales.  
 
Figure 2-4 about here (see appendix II) 
 
We can confirm hypothesis 2 for all victimizations. In the gain-frame (thus the more fre-
quent event), vague quantifiers correspond to higher likelihoods than in the loss-frame, 
as shown in figures 2-4. For theft and robbery, we observe considerable differences be-
                                                 
7 The two dimensions ‘frequency’ and ‘severity’ of an offence could not be manipulated independently of 
each other. In order to exclude a possible confounding of the two effects, applications to enable to 
separate both manipulations could be developed in future studies. A conceivable possibility in medicine 
would be to analyze different types of cancer in order to manipulate ‘frequency’ (disease risk) and 
‘severity’ (mortality risk) independently of each other. For a more detailed discussion of this subject in the 
medical context see Weber & Hilton (1990), Merz, Druzdzel & Mazur (1991), Sutherland, Lockwood, 
Trichtler, Sem, Brooks & Till (1991), and Budescu & Wallsten (1995, p. 294).  
8 In their study on mapping of vague quantifiers, Wright, Gaskell, & O’Muircheartaigh (1994) also compute 
OLS regressions and interpret the resulting regression lines as “response functions”.  
  16tween 20-25% for the two respective response functions. We refer to the appendix I for 
exact values of the regression estimates.  
So far, we investigated inter-personal effects. However, the intra-personal test reveals 
even greater magnitude. Here, the same respondent estimates twice her likelihood to 
become a victim of robbery; once for gains and once for losses. We randomly allocated 
two groups to two different conditions. The experimental group had first to estimate the 
likelihood to become a victim of robbery (question 1, loss-frame). After some questions, 
they were asked to evaluate their likelihood of being spared to become a victim of rob-
bery (question 9, gain-frame). The control group answered twice the question to become 
victim of crime (question 1 and 9 twice in the loss-frame). We report differences in re-
sponse functions in figure 5 and 6. 
 
Figure 5 and 6 about here (see appendix II) 
 
The same respondent assigns higher percentages to equivalent verbal probability ex-
pressions in the gain-frame compared to the loss-frame. In contrast, persons who an-
swered the same question twice in the loss-frame gave consistent answers. Thus, re-
sults for hypothesis 2 can be confirmed with intra-personal tests as well. We conclude 
that respondents communicate with identical vague quantifiers higher subjective prob-
abilities in cases of frequent incidents compared to rare events. With increasing fre-
quency of the events, the intercepts of the response functions shift upwards.  
4.3 Severity of victimizations and communication patterns 
In hypothesis 3 we argue that with increasing severity of the offence, the slope of the 
response function between vague quantifiers and numerical values decreases. We con-
  17firm hypothesis 3 with our analysis visualized in figure 7: With increasing severity, 
measured by the particular kind of victimization, (ascending: bill-dodging, robbery, mur-
der), identical verbal likelihood expressions correspond to lower numerical probabilities. 
The slopes for the response functions are as follows: Bill-dodging: b = 13.6; robbery: b = 
9.2; murder: b = 7.3. See appendix I for more details.  
 
Figure 7 about here 
 
Comparisons between different offences reveal that respondents mean by similar verbal 
probability expressions different likelihoods. For example, “very likely” to become a vic-
tim of murder states a lower likelihood than a “very likely” to become a victim of bill-
dodging. In particular, the verbal label “very likely” for murder refers to a likelihood lower 
than 40% compared to the verbal label “very likely” for bill-dodging, which refers to a 
likelihood higher than 60%.  
 
5 Discussion 
The frame of reference has great impact on the perception and communication of prob-
ability statements. We demonstrate a wording effect on subjective probability estimates. 
Respondents give different estimates for personal victimizations if survey questions are 
worded differently. The subjective probability estimates differ depending on whether re-
spondents are asked for the risk to become a victim of a particular crime or for the risk of 
being spared of a particular crime. Furthermore, we show that the same verbal probabil-
ity expressions have different meanings in different situations. On the one hand, “likely” 
refers to lower probabilities in cases of rarer events (‘become victim’) compared to more 
  18frequent events (‘being spared’). On the other hand, a “likely” victimization refers to low-
er probabilities in cases of more severe victimizations compared to less severe victimi-
zations.
9  
 
In conclusion, direct comparisons between proportions of different victimizations on ca-
tegorical answer scales can be regarded as problematic, because interpretations of an-
swer categories depend on the wording, the frequency and the severity of the offence. 
Thus, survey answers are prone to biases in perception and communication of probabili-
ties. For example, respondents mean lower probabilities when they communicate their 
risk to become a victim of murder as “very likely”, compared to communicating their risk 
to become a victim of robbery as “very likely”. However, for direct comparisons between 
different subjective victimization risks, respondents have to use verbal answer catego-
ries consistently: A “very likely” robbery should refer to similar probabilities as a “very 
likely” murder. This assumption is not empirically met and thus individual and group dif-
ferences for different risk evaluations are not detectable, if differences are only esti-
mated by verbal answer categories.  
 
A promising alternative to verbal answer scales were frequency formats to capture sub-
jective victimization risks. Frequency formats are based on findings of cognitive psy-
chology, according to which the presentation and communication of statistical informa-
tion in form of frequencies is more intuitive and understandable than alternative forms of 
                                                 
9 In the pretest of our instrument, investigations of respondents’ answering strategies on the basis of 
qualitative interviews (N=12) showed that victimization probabilities for frequent offences (e.g. bill-
dodging) in the preceding year were derived from the rate of personal victimizations in the past year. 
However, in the case of rare offences, respondents rather oriented themselves at victimizations of other 
people. For example, in the case of murder, newspaper articles were used for comparisons. Future 
studies could investigate these answering strategies in more detail.  
  19presentation such as probabilities and percentages: “Natural frequencies facilitate infe-
rences because they carry implicit information about base rates (…). They also corres-
pond to the way in which humans have experienced statistical information over most of 
their history.” (Hoffrage, Lindsey, Hertwig & Gigerenzer, 2000, p. 2261). A known prob-
lem is the subjective overestimation of risks associated with rare events (fictitious exam-
ple: “How likely is it that a randomly selected person from your neighbourhood will be-
come a victim of a robbery during the next 12 months?”). Formulating items to measure 
subjective risks in terms of frequencies encourages distributional thinking and results in 
more realistic estimates of the base rate (fictitious example: “Imagine 1000 people from 
your neighbourhood. How many of these people will become a victim of a robbery during 
the next 12 months?”). As Teigen (1974) shows, subjective overestimation of small 
probabilities decreases when respondents estimate risks in frequencies rather than 
probabilities. Coutts (2002) points out that frequency formats (“distributional perspec-
tive”) lead to more realistic, lower estimates of offence-specific victimization risks than 
other formats (“singular perspective”).  
 
Further research might investigate differences in framing-effects for verbal and numeri-
cal scales. It can be argued that context effects should be even stronger for verbal 
scales (Moxey & Sanford, 2000, p. 238; Welkenhuysen, Evers-Kiebooms & D’Ydewalle, 
2001). However, results are contradictory. Jasper, Goel, Einarson, Gallo & Koren (2001) 
reported only significant framing effects for numerical scales. It would be interesting to 
investigate this interaction effect in more depth to improve our understanding of survey 
responses in general. Such better understanding would enhance better informed and 
substantiated choices of verbal versus numerical response scales. In medicine, for ex-
  20ample, the usage of verbal answer categories is widely rejected (Nakao & Axelrod, 
1983). As a consequence, most articles in this area deal with advantages and disadvan-
tages of different numerical scales. Ghosh & Ghosh (2005) reviewed results from 52 
studies. 17 studies dealt with the question, whether students of medicine and doctors 
could correctly interpret and communicate probabilities: “Physicians demonstrate widely 
varying understanding of probability terms and NNT [number needed to treat].“ (Ghosh 
& Ghosh, 2005, p. 178) Even greater problems were documented for patients in the re-
maining 35 studies. In contrast, in some studies, verbal scales yield better results than 
numerical scales. Woloshin, Schwartz, Black & Welch (1999) reported that women esti-
mate their risk of breast cancer more realistically with verbal compared to numerical 
scales. Women drastically overestimated their risk of breast cancer with numerical 
scales. Finally, Windschitl and Wells (1996, p. 343) conclude that both, verbal and nu-
merical scales bear several advantages: “Results suggest that numeric measures tend 
to elicit deliberate and rule-based reasoning from respondents, whereas verbal meas-
ures allow for more associative and intuitive thinking”.  
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  24Appendix I: Tables 
Table 1: Items of the questionnaire
10 
Question 1:  First I would like to talk to you about your personal exposure to danger. I 
will present you different situations and would like to ask you to estimate your 
likelihood that you get involved in such a situation within the next 12 months. 
You find the scenarios on the following cards.  
 
  How likely do you think is it that within the next 12 months  
 
  … a customer disappears without having paid?  
  … someone threatens you with violence in order to get your money or your 
valuables?   
  … someone kills you?  
Question 9: 
 
Version 1 How likely do you think is it that you are spared of the following situation (...) 
within the next twelve months? (...) How likely do you think is it that you do not 
get involved into the following situation?  
 
Version 2 How likely do you think is it that you come across the following situation (...) 
within the next twelve months? How likely do you think is it that you do get 
involved into the following situation? 
 
  … a customer steals your purse and disappears. 
  … someone threatens you with violence in order to get your money or your 
valuables. 
  … another road user ignores your right of way, and causes a crash. 
 
Answer:  1 – by no means, 2 – very unlikely, 3 – unlikely, 4 – partly unlikely, partly 
likely, 5 – likely, 6 – very likely 
 
  Please also indicate the likelihood in terms of percentages. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Arithmetic mean of subjective probability estimates for different victimizations 
(N in brackets) 
 Robbery  Theft  Car  Crash 
Loss-frame 21,9  (87)  20,6 (87)  51,4 (85) 
Gain-frame (100-p)  35,5 (99)  31,0 (99)  48,8 (96) 
p-value (one-sided t-test) 0.0003  0.0042  0.7560 
 
                                                 
10  The items and answer scales were originally posed in German. Here, we show the English translation.  
  25Bivariate linear OLS-regressions were estimated. For each victimization, the verbal 
answer category is regressed on the numeric percentage scale.  
 
 
Table 3: Response functions of inter-personal framing, robbery (see figure 2)
11 
Delict: robbery  b-coefficient  standard 
error 
95%-conf. interval  N 
Loss-frame: become victim     
Slope 12.9  1.6  (9.6;  16.1)  87 
Intercept 9.2  2.4  (4.3;  14)   
Gain-Frame: spared     
Slope 13.5  1.8  (9.8;  17.1)  99 
Intercept 32.4  5.0  (22.5;  42.2)   
 
 
 
Table 4: Response functions of inter-personal framing, theft (see figure 3) 
Delict: theft  b-coefficient  standard 
error  95%-conf. interval  N 
Loss-frame: become victim   
Slope 9.7  1.5  (6.7;  12.8)  87 
Intercept 12.8  2.2  (8.3;  17.2)   
Gain-Frame: spared         
Slope 14.2  1.7  (10.9;  17.5)  99 
Intercept 32.7  4.8  (23.1;  42.3)   
 
 
 
Table 5: Response functions of inter-personal framing, car accident (see figure 4) 
Delict: car accident  b-coefficient  standard 
error  95%-conf. interval  N 
Loss-frame: become victim   
Slope 13.1  1.6  (9.8;  16.3)  85 
Intercept 19.9  4.4  (11.1;  28.6)   
Gain-frame: spared         
Slope 9.8  1.6  (6.7;  13)  96 
Intercept 33  3.6  (25.9;  40.2)   
 
 
                                                 
11 To account for possible cluster-effects, robust standard errors were estimated in addition (Huber-White-
Sandwich-Variance-Estimator). As expected, the standard errors slightly increased. However, our 
conclusions remain valid. On this account, these results are not reported. The supplemental estimations 
can be obtained from the authors upon request.  
  26Table 6: Response functions of intra-personal framing, experimental-condition (see 
figure 5) 
Delict: robbery  b-coefficient standard 
error 
95%-conf. interval  N 
Loss-frame: become victim         
Slope 8.0  2.0  (4;  11.9)  100 
Intercept 13.7  2.6  (8.4;  18.9)   
Gain-frame: spared         
Slope 13.5  1.8  (9.8;  17.1)  99 
Intercept 32.4  5.0  (22.5;  42.2)   
 
 
 
Table 7: Response functions of intra-personal framing, control-condition (see figure 6) 
Delict: robbery  b-coefficient standard 
error 
95%-conf. interval  N 
Loss-frame: become victim         
Slope 10.4  2.1  (6.2;  14.5)  89 
Intercept 13.0  3.2  (6.7;  19.3)   
Loss-frame: become victim         
Slope 12.9  1.6  (9.6;  16.1)  87 
Intercept 9.2  2.4  (4.3;  14)   
 
 
 
Table 8: Response functions of offence specific mapping, loss-frame (see figure 7)  
  b-coefficient standard 
error 
95%-conf. interval  N 
Bill-dodging        
Slope 13.6  1.3  (11.1;  16.1)  189 
Intercept 10.8  2.8  (5.2;  16.4)   
Robbery        
Slope 9.2  1.4  (6.4;  12.1)  189 
Intercept 13.4  2.0  (9.4;  17.4)   
Murder        
Slope 7.3  1.1  (5.1;  9.5)  186 
Intercept 9.5  1.3  (6.9;  12.2)   
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Figure 1: 
 
Figure 1: Boxplots show the distribution of numerical probability estimates for 
both frames (being spared versus become victim) for each offence. In the gain-
frame, reversed probabilities (100-p) are shown to allow for direct comparisons. 
Analyses refer to question 9. 
 
  28       Figure 2: 
 
Figure 2: Inter-personal framing for robbery (question 9). The solid re-
gression line represents the response function for the gain frame (being 
spared of robbery) and the dashed line for the loss frame (become vic-
tim of robbery). 
  29Figure 3: 
 
Figure 3: Inter-personal framing for theft (question 9). The solid regres-
sion line represents the response function for the gain frame (being 
spared of theft) and the dashed line for the loss frame (become victim of 
theft). 
  30Figure 4: 
 
Figure 4: Inter-personal framing for car accident (question 9). The solid 
regression line represents the response function for the gain frame (be-
ing spared of a car accident) and the dashed line for the loss frame (be-
come victim of a car accident). 
  31Figure 5: 
 
Figure 5: Intra-personal framing for robbery in the experimental condi-
tion. The solid regression line represents the response function for the 
gain frame (being spared of a robbery) for question 9 and the dashed 
line represents the response function for the loss frame (become victim 
of robbery) for question 1. 
  32Figure 6: 
 
Figure 6: Intra-personal framing for robbery in the control condition. Both 
regression lines represent response functions in the loss frame (become 
victim of robbery). The dashed line represents answers for the loss 
frame in question 1 and the solid line represents the response function 
for the loss frame in question 9.  
  33Figure 7: 
 
Figure 7: Offence specific mapping: bill-dodging, robbery, murder (question 1).  
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